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“But he has nothing on at all!”
Canada and the Iraq War, 2003
Timothy A. Sayle

I

n Hans Christian Andersen’s
fable The Emperor’s New Clothes,
an emperor is swindled into buying
a new wardrobe. The wardrobe,
of course, does not really exist and
the emperor appears publicly in the
nude. He and his courtiers, convinced
only the worthy can see the garments,
are unwilling to admit they see
wholly through the new clothes. In
Andersen’s version, one young child
loudly exclaimed the emperor was
naked. In 2003, a similar drama –
though with far greater consequences
– played on the world stage.
In the lead-up to the invasion
of Iraq, France and other states
called out shrilly that they could see
through the American case for war.
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien, too,
noticed early the United States’ case
for war was built on a faulty premise,
but he avoided the adversarial tones
adopted by the French. Rather than
publicly embarrass the Americans,
Chrétien told President George W.
Bush that Canada would support
military action against Iraq if the
United States could convince
the international community an
invasion was necessary. By basing
his test of support on overwhelming
international approval – and not
ruling out Canadian participation
– Chrétien ensured Canada was a

Abstract: In March 2003, Canada
abstained from participating in the
invasion of Iraq. Despite international
pressure from Canada’s close allies,
the United States and Great Britain, and
against the urging of some domestic
lobby groups and the Official Opposition,
Prime Minister Jean Chrétien chose not
to provide military or political support for
the invasion. Chrétien’s decision was a
controversial one, but one made early
in the crisis and before the outbreak of
war. Although Canadian public opinion
and the professional advice of Canadian
diplomats and intelligence officials
counselled against participation in
the war, these arguments served only
to buttress Chrétien’s initial negative
reaction and his desire to work within
the United Nations.

relevant player in the United Nations
debate. When international approval
had not been gained by the eve of war,
the prime minister stood fast with the
position he had communicated to
both Bush and British Prime Minister
Tony Blair in the late summer of 2002,
and kept Canada out of the war.
Shortly after 11 September 2001,
Canadian ambassador to the United
States Michael Kergin arrived in
Ottawa to brief the government on
the ramifications of the terrorist
attacks. He described the Manichean
worldview Washington had adopted
in the wake of the attack, and warned

© Canadian
Military
History,
Volume2010
19, Number 4, Autumn 2010, pp.5-19.
Published
by Scholars
Commons
@ Laurier,

Sayle - Iraq War REV.indd 1

Canada must be prepared to deal with
a United States whose international
outlook was coloured only in black
and white. Although Afghanistan
would undoubtedly be the first target
of the American response, Kergin
knew that American retaliation
was not likely to be limited to one
country.1 In the mean time, while
Afghanistan was the only front in
the response to the terrorist attacks,
Canadian policy easily matched that
expected by the Americans. Jean
Chrétien honoured those killed in
the attacks, publicly supported the
United States at the United Nations
and dispatched special operations
forces, naval assets and later a battle
group to Afghanistan.2
As American and allied operations
in Afghanistan began in earnest
in the autumn of 2001, it became
increasingly obvious that the United
States was considering a second
target.3 Soon after 11 September 2001,
Canadian officials noticed American
intelligence reports paying special
attention to Iraq, isolating it from lists
of other countries and noting Iraq’s
failure to express sympathy with the
Americans.4 Around the same time,
Chrétien was alarmed by a television
interview with United States Senator
Jesse Helms calling for an invasion
of Iraq. 5 It was not long before the
5
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captured the two main elements in
Chrétien’s conception of the crisis.
Only weeks after Himelfarb’s
warning, Chrétien informed Blair
and Bush of Canada’s position on
war with Iraq. The prime minister’s
comments to Bush and Blair would
set the approach Canada would
follow through the difficult months
to come. While meeting with Blair
in Johannesburg in early September,
Chrétien expressed his discomfort
with regime change in Iraq. He
warned of the dangers of “getting
in to the business of replacing
leaders we don’t like” without
being covered “under the flag of
the UN.”8 No country, Chrétien told
Blair, could invade Iraq without
UN authorization. Clearly, Chrétien
believed any military action would
not simply be a continuation of
United Nations pressure on Iraq to
disarm, but part of a new American
concept of national security that
threatened to undermine the
international structures Canada had
worked to create. 9
On 9 September 2002, less
than a week after meeting with
Blair, Chrétien and Bush met in
Detroit to announce a new border

(AP Photo/Doug Mills)

American press started reporting on
intelligence leaks that linked Saddam
Hussein to Al-Qaeda, and by January
2002 Kergin was fielding questions
from reporters curious if Canada
would support an invasion of Iraq.6
By August 2002, there was no
doubt in Ottawa that the United States
would target Iraq. Expanding the
“War on Terror” beyond Afghanistan
was not something Canada
would agree to without careful
consideration. On 14 August, Clerk
of the Privy Council Alex Himelfarb
sent Chrétien a memorandum stating
bluntly: “U.S. action against Iraq
to implement regime change is
a question of when, not if, using
the justification that the Iraqi
government is a sponsor of terrorism
and a developer of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD).” 7 Himelfarb
noted the international community
was deeply split on the issue, but
the Canadian position “has centred
on the return of UN arms inspectors
to Iraq to resolve the disarmament
question and to address the issues
of terrorism when clear evidence is
available.” The memorandum’s faith
in the United Nations inspectors
and disapproval of regime change

agreement between Canada and
the United States. By all accounts,
the relationship between Chrétien
and Bush was a friendly one with
good personal chemistry aided by
a mutual interest in baseball and
golf.10 It was strange for all observers,
however, when the two men opted
to meet in private before their
announcement, without the usual
retinue of staffers to hear or record
their conversation.11 After the halfhour meeting, Chrétien de-briefed
Kergin, telling him he had expressed
concern over the impending invasion
of Iraq. Chrétien had told Bush the
international community would not
accept an invasion of Iraq without
credible evidence of weapons of mass
destruction. Chrétien had also made
clear the United Nations Security
Council was extremely important to
Canada, and Canada would require
its approval to participate in a war.12
Chrétien left the meeting highly
sceptical of the American evidence
for war, but still on good terms with
Bush.13
Chrétien’s comments in Detroit
came to serve as the speaking points
for the Canadian government.
Kergin returned to Washington
equipped with the prime minister’s
position; from now on his standard
response to any inquiries on Canada’s
participation in an invasion would
stress the importance of the Security
Council. Across the Atlantic, Canada’s
high commissioner to the United
Kingdom, Mel Cappe, informed the
British that Canada sought agreement
Canadian Prime Minister Jean Chrétien
salutes members of the US Border
Patrol as President George W. Bush
looks on after the two leaders watch
a Free and Secure Trade “Fast” Lane
demonstration, at the Ambassador’s
Bridge, Fort Street Cargo Facility,
in Detroit, 9 September 2002. Bush
spent the day making his case to
Chrétien, who said the previous week
he has yet to see evidence that would
justify Canadian support for a military
campaign against Iraq.
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President George W. Bush addresses the
UN General Assembly in New York City.

among the international community
before military action, preferably
through a Security Council Resolution
at the United Nations.14 Deputy Prime
Minister John Manley told the press
that Canada had not “signed on” to
“going in and changing the regime”
in Iraq.15 Underlying this standard
message, however, was the prime
minister’s scepticism of American
motives. Chrétien already assumed
the goal of military intervention was
regime change. Warnings from Paul
Heinbecker, Canada’s ambassador
to the United Nations, stressed a
new American security strategy
with emphasis on unilateral military
intervention reinforced his concern.16
Just days after the Detroit meeting,
Bush appeared before the United
Nations General Assembly and
argued for increased international
pressure on Iraq to ensure Saddam
Hussein complied with his
obligations to disarm. A month
later, in November 2002, the Security
Council passed Resolution 1441,
declaring Iraq “in material breach
of its obligations [to disarm]” and
affording Iraq “a final opportunity
to comply with its disarmament
obligations.”17 The resolution was
achieved by intense negotiation, and
contained contradictory elements.
It did not directly authorize the
use of force, and the “serious
consequences” threatened were
variously interpreted. For those
who interpreted the resolution as
authorizing force, a lack of time
limits resulted in further confusion.18
In Britain, the ambiguity of 1441
and the looming war caused a rift
in the governing Labour caucus
and a major crisis for Tony Blair.
To assuage his critics and his party,
Blair promised to seek a second,
less ambiguous, resolution from the
Security Council.19
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
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The confusion inherent in 1441,
and Blair’s promise, led to further
intense negotiations in New York.
During the negotiations, Chrétien
frequently called President Vincente
Fox of Mexico and President Ricardo
Lagos of Chile, both of whose nations
were represented on the Security
Council. Noticing the stress these
men were facing, Chrétien remarked
to Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill
Graham that although Canada
constantly sought a seat on the
Security Council, holding a seat was
a mixed blessing. At times like this, it
would bring enormous pressure like
that faced by Mexico and Chile. While
free of the Security Council, Canada
was able to operate at the United
Nations with fewer constraints.20
Despite not having a seat on the
Council, Graham was in constant
contact with his European and
American colleagues; Dominique de
Villepin of France, Javier Solana of
the European Union, but much less
with British Foreign Minister Jack
Straw. Graham’s closest contact was
Secretary of State Colin Powell, with
whom Graham enjoyed a relationship
that allowed for frank discussion.
In December 2002, Graham told
Powell that Canadians were trying
to help the Americans obtain a new
resolution. Powell said the Americans
“really would rather not have your

help.” Concerned by this, Graham
told Powell that if the United States
did not gain another resolution,
“we’re not going to be there, other
people won’t be there either, it won’t
be good for the UN and in the end it
won’t be good for you.”21
A significant Canadian troop
presence in Iraq was a moot point
after a 9 January 2003 meeting
in Washington between Defence
Minister John McCallum and Secretary
of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. In the
meeting, Rumsfeld made clear he
was not seeking Canadian troops
for Iraq, and preferred Canada
focus on Afghanistan. Neither
the Pentagon nor the Office of the
Secretary of Defense intimated to
the Canadian embassy they would
require Canadian troops in Iraq, or
that they were upset when Canada
did not send troops. During a visit
to Central Command Headquarters
in Tampa, Florida, and in meetings
with General Tommy Franks, Kergin
never received a message Canada
ought to be involved in the military
component of the invasion.22 But to
suggest, as Janice Gross Stein and
Eugene Lang do, that Canada’s
decision to commit almost two
thousand troops to Afghanistan
got Canada “off the hook in Iraq”
misconstrues the American pressure
on Canada in the lead up to war.23
7
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Top: Canadian Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham (left) talking with US Secretary
of State Colin Powell, 22 November 2002.
Bottom: Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld escorts Canadian Minister of National
Defence John McCallum into the Pentagon on 9 January 2003. The two defence leaders
met to discuss security issues of mutual interest.

Although there was strong desire
from elements in the Canadian
military and Department of National
Defence for Canada to participate
in the invasion, it was the White
House, not the Pentagon, who sought
the Canadian flag and the political
cover it granted an invasion.24 The
decision to take a command rotation
in Afghanistan alleviated none of
the pressure on Canada to publicly
support the legitimacy of an invasion
of Iraq.
8
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Immediately following the
Rumsfeld-McCallum meeting,
McCallum announced Canada
would participate if the United
Nations granted approval for an
invasion.25 If, on the other hand, UN
authorization were not forthcoming,
Canada would still have a choice to
make. Chrétien quickly corrected
McCallum, declaring: “on matters of
peace and security, the international
community must speak and act
through the UN Security Council.”26

The mild rebuke generated reports
of divisions in Chrétien’s cabinet.
Although the Cabinet frequently
discussed Iraq, it was never a specific
agenda item but instead was treated
under “General Business.” Minister
of the Environment David Anderson
recalls that knowledge of the Middle
East was slight in Cabinet, and
even knowledge of the geography
surrounding Iraq was limited. For
some, the limited understanding of the
region was coloured by information
from the Israeli government, passed
on by constituents with whom a
minister or MP had reason to keep on
friendly terms.27 Overall, the Cabinet
was largely sceptical of war, and
conversation concerned CanadianAmerican relations, not Iraq itself.
To differ with the Americans on an
international issue was not in itself
surprising or necessarily problematic,
but the American rhetoric linking Iraq
with the vital interests of the United
States made this an exceptionally
difficult situation.28 Two members
of Cabinet, Manley and Secretary
of State for International Financial
Institutions Maurizio Bevilacqua,
were later reported to have argued in
favour of the war, fearing a political
and economic backlash from the
United States if Canada did not
support its ally.29
Although no straw poll or
other count of opinion was taken
in Cabinet, the prime minister did
consult key cabinet ministers in
private discussions. Ministers such as
Graham and McCallum were asked
to weigh in, as were Ambassadors
Heinbecker and Kergin. The prime
minister also kept the pulse of his
parliamentary caucus, the views of
which “were a significant factor in
the final decision.”30 Many Liberal
members were responding to
concerns of their constituents who
collected signatures for petitions
against the war. The caucus was
nearly unanimous in opposition
to war without the support of the
United Nations, save one lone voice.31

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre AP2002-5412

NATO Photo b021122e.jpg

US Department of Defense photo 030109-D-2987S-002
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David Pratt, Liberal chairman of
the Commons defence committee,
argued that basing a Canadian
decision on the will of the United
Nations was an “abdication of
national responsibility.”32
Given the overwhelming support
of caucus and Cabinet for Chrétien’s
position, McCallum’s comments
in early January did not reveal a
rupture in government opinion.
Instead, Chrétien’s correction of
McCallum’s remarks demonstrates
his carefully managed strategy of
avoiding direct disagreement with
the United States. The Canadians
ensured, through careful choice of
words in press conferences and in
the House, that a door was left open
for Canadian participation if the

Security Council overwhelmingly
approved a military action but a
Russian or Chinese veto prohibited
a resolution. 33 It is by this reasoning
that Chrétien could argue Resolution
1441 did not necessarily need to be
augmented by another resolution
to authorize an invasion, and that
the Canadian position in 2003 was
consistent with its 1999 participation
in the NATO bombing of Serbia.
The seeming discrepancy between
the two situations was a point of
criticism made by many, including
American ambassador to Canada
Paul Cellucci. 34 David Anderson,
who sat in the Cabinet during both
the 1999 and 2003 decisions, notes
the “difference was primarily that the
international community was simply

much more coherent on the Kosovo
issue.”35 In early 2003, it was clear
just how incoherent the international
community had become.
Towards the end of January,
Blair called Chrétien to tell him a
successive resolution was going
to pass in the Security Council
and Canada should lend it moral
support. Paul Heinbecker, who was
in frequent telephone contact with
Chrétien from late January until midMarch, told him Blair was wrong and
the British and Americans would not
get a second resolution authorizing
war. Heinbecker, from New York,
told Chrétien “People here just don’t
believe they’ve made the case.”36
On 30 January 2003, Bill Graham
met with Colin Powell in Washington

Canadian Forces Joint Imagery Centre AP2002-5412

High in the mountains of Afghanistan, soldiers of the 3rd Battalion, Princess Patricia's Canadian Light Infantry Battlegroup disembark
from a US Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter, 7 May 2002. They are involved in a Canadian-led mission to search the Tora Bora caves
for Al-Qaeda materiel, documents and bodies, and then to destroy the caves to prevent Al-Qaeda fighters from operating in the region.
The 3 PPCLI Battlegroup was deployed to Afghanistan on Operation APOLLO, Canada's military contribution to the international
campaign against terrorism.
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A high-level meeting of the UN Security Council took place on 5 February 2003 to
hear a statement by US Secretary of State Colin Powell (shown here holding a model
vial of anthrax). He briefed the council on his country’s evidence of the Iraqi weapons
programme, including the threat posed by Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass
destruction.

and was shown some of the evidence
Powell would present to the Security
Council the following week. In
another frank discussion, Graham
told Powell war would “be a terrible
problem for the United States and for
everybody.” Graham went on:
as far as I can see your problem is
going to be, if you go in there and
it’s not universally accepted, you’re
going to be an invader, and you
think you’re going in as a liberator,
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but after you’ve been there a little
while the people are going to hate
you, and you’re going to get hated
by everybody. You think it’s going
to be a big love-in but you risk being
perceived as an occupier. 37

Powell disagreed, saying “this will
be all over quickly.” He told Graham
a resolution was a good thing, but
should be achieved before February.
Graham, quick to see the implications
of this remark, told Powell it sounded

“like you’ve already made up your
mind to go whether you get one or
not. If you get it it’s a cover, if not,
‘to hell with it,’ is sort of what you’re
saying.” Powell did not reply, but his
body language indicated to Graham
he had understood the situation
perfectly. In the press conference
that followed, Graham insisted four
times that Canada would want any
war with Iraq to be sanctioned by
the UN.38
Graham’s repeated reference
to the United Nations reflected
Canadian public thinking on the
issue. Two days after Graham’s
meeting with Powell, an Ipsos-Reid
poll found 36 percent of Canadians
against war altogether, with 46
percent supporting war only with
United Nations backing. A mere
10 percent of Canadians supported
military action without the backing
of the United Nations. The resistance
of Canadians to any military action,
UN-authorized or not, was strong
nation-wide. In Quebec, 46 percent
were against any military action. 35
percent of Ontarians, 34 percent of
Atlantic Canadians, 28 percent of
British Columbians and 27 percent
of those in Alberta Manitoba and
Saskatchewan were against the war
even if a Security Council resolution
was obtained. 39 Nonetheless, as
evidenced by Graham’s comment
in Washington, the government
was willing, at least publicly, to
entertain the idea of supporting
an invasion with Security Council
approval but without a resolution.
For Cappe in London, it seemed that
by remaining somewhat ambivalent
and ambiguous, the Canadians
forced the Americans to take them
seriously as a potential partner. This
ensured Canada would be listened
to in New York and Washington
while negotiations on a further UN
resolution continued.40
On January 27, Hans Blix updated
the Security Council on the inspection
of Iraq’s weapons programs. Blix, as
the executive chairman of the United
6
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Nations Monitoring, Verification, and
Inspection Commission (UNMOVIC)
was tasked with verifying Iraq’s
disarmament. He reported to the
Council “Iraq appears not to have
come to a genuine acceptance…
of the disarmament which was
demanded of it.” This rebuke had
a double-edged effect, spurring
the Iraqis to increase co-operation
while the United States held up
Blix’s comments as independent
verification of their claims that
Saddam would not disarm.41
The next week, on 5 February,
Powell appeared before the Council
and presented a number of photos and
sound recordings of the threat posed
by Saddam. Powell’s presentation,
according to Heinbecker, “was a
load of crap, the best case that could
be pieced together, but evidently
full of problems and inconsistent in
several cases with what the UN had
reported from the ground.” 42 Photos
of a fighter jet spraying poison gas
were dated from the war against
Iran. Satellite photos purporting to
show chemical weapons sites, later
disproved, were “pretty evidently
bogus at the time,” while accounts
of intercepted conversations were so
unspecific “they could be taken to
mean almost anything.” Heinbecker
was astonished that this was the
best the Americans had to offer,
and felt few were persuaded. Due
to the eminence of the presenter, the
Council was packed with onlookers,
some of whom took the opportunity
afterwards to share their frustration.
Heinbecker and the Egyptian
ambassador to the United Nations
had an opportunity to speak to
Powell. The Egyptian ambassador
warned the Americans that while
the invasion might succeed easily
the US could face decades of conflict

in Iraq and centuries more to regain
America’s reputation in the region.
Canadian officials had their own
reason to question the intelligence
presented by Powell. They had
access to the same information, and
had already found it wanting. In
autumn 2002, Bush had offered to
send intelligence experts to Ottawa
to brief the prime minister, and
later offered to come and brief
Chrétien personally. Chrétien and
his advisors agreed that it would be
particularly uncomfortable to dispute
the president’s evidence in person,
and decided information should be
passed to Canada through regular
intelligence-sharing channels.
Eddie Goldenberg, always
sceptical of intelligence, recalls that
intelligence was not a factor in
the Canadian decision on Iraq. 43
Intriguingly, however, it seems that
Canadian intelligence officials made
one of the most successful analyses
of the Iraqi weapons program
among Canada’s traditional allies.
During the lead up to the war, the
International Assessments Staff (IAS)
in the Privy Council Office (PCO)
served as the intelligence assessment
branch for both Foreign Affairs and
PCO. Through its established links
with other intelligence communities,
the IAS received large quantities
of information on supposed Iraqi

weapons programs, including the
intelligence behind Tony Blair’s
claim that Iraq had weapons of mass
destruction that could be deployed
in 45 minutes. The Canadians also
received intelligence passed along
from the Iraqi defector “Curveball,”
the informant responsible for Colin
Powell’s claims of mobile weapons
production vehicles. Despite the
amount of circumstantial or indirect
intelligence reporting that suggested
an active WMD program, the lack of
any direct intelligence led the IAS to
assess repeatedly that there was no
evidence Iraq had an active WMD
program, or had developed the
necessary delivery capacity.44
The Canadians came close to not
receiving some of the intelligence at
all. Some in the upper echelons of
the Bush administration considered
dropping Canada from the shared
pool of information, wanting to
restrict circulation to states that had
guaranteed support to the Americans.
The Canadian embassy worked
hard to ensure this did not happen,
arguing that Canada deserved access
to the common pool due to their
contribution in Afghanistan and their
promise to help rebuild Iraq if war
came.45
Perhaps one of the most important
pieces of intelligence collected by
the Canadian government did not

Minister of Foreign Affairs Bill Graham
and Prime Minister Jean Chrétien at a
North Atlantic Council Meeting
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concern the working of Saddam
Hussein’s government, but the Bush
administration. In the months before
the war, the intelligence liaison
officer at the Canadian embassy
in Washington received regular
briefings from the CIA, but was also
made aware of frustrations in the
American intelligence community.
As a result, the Canadians were aware
the CIA was under political pressure
to produce information confirming
Saddam Hussein’s arsenal, and knew
a debate over the accuracy of the
American intelligence was raging
secretly in Washington.46
Nonetheless, the Americans
had presented their intelligence at
the Security Council, and Powell
was continuing efforts at the United
Nations. In the week following
Powell’s presentation to the Security
Council, after a Cabinet meeting
where the issue was discussed,
Heinbecker and Assistant Deputy
Minister James Wright discussed
the situation in the hallway. Neither
man liked having “to choose between
our neighbour superpower and our
foreign policy and the international
community.”47 Heinbecker knew no
compromise was possible between
the hard positions of yes or no on
war. But if the decision-making was
elongated in time, with Iraq facing
a set timeline and a simple pass or
fail disarmament test, agreement
might be reached at the Security
Council. This was the next logical
step in a series of resolutions that
had increasingly turned up the heat
on Iraq. The Canadian plan could
assure the Americans “the diplomatic
process wasn’t going to last forever,
and the Europeans and the rest of the
international community would have
the assurance that it wasn’t going to
be straight off to war.”48
Chrétien backed Heinbecker’s
plan, hoping “if we could get an
extra six to eight weeks, the U.S.
military strategists would have to
delay their plans long enough to give

12
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everyone more time to work out a
diplomatic solution.”49 To publicly
clarify Canada’s position on the war,
Chrétien delivered a speech to the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations
on 13 February. He declared: “if
it must come to war, I argue that
the world should respond through
the United Nations.” Chrétien
commended Bush for approaching
the United Nations in the fall of
2002, and urged the United States
not to give up on the world body.
“The long-term interests of the
United States,” suggested Chrétien,
“will be better served by acting
through the United Nations than by
acting alone.”50 Chrétien followed
up on his speech with calls to world
leaders seeking their support for
a compromise position at the UN
– a compromise that could repair
the valued multilateral institution
torn asunder by its membership’s
debate over the looming invasion.
Two days after Chrétien’s speech,
Canadians demonstrated loudly
against the impending war. 100,000
protesters took to the streets in
Montreal, with protests in the tens of
thousands occurring simultaneously
in Vancouver, Toronto and Edmonton
and ranging from the hundreds to
the thousands in other provincial
capitals.51
On 19 February, Heinbecker
brought the Canadian compromise
position before the Security Council
with a stirring speech. He reminded
the Council of the many voices calling
for peace around the world, but
acknowledged important questions
remained about Iraq’s weapons
programs. He suggested the Security
Council direct Hans Blix to establish
a list of “key remaining disarmament
tasks,” in order of urgency, and to
present the list to Iraq with a deadline
for compliance. While a failure
to find common ground would
have “profound consequences” for
international peace and security and
the future of the United Nations, he

declared both the government and
people of Canada believed a peaceful
resolution remained possible. 52
In the days following
Heinbecker’s speech, Graham took
the floor in the House of Commons
to explain Canada was working at
the UN “to avert war by clarifying
the situation.”53 Graham explained
the two Canadian objectives: first,
by suggesting a resolution with
a timeframe, the international
community could communicate to
Saddam Hussein that his failure to
comply could not drag on further. The
second objective was to demonstrate
to the international community a UN
solution was possible and desirable.54
Back at the United Nations, on
24 February, Heinbecker circulated
a discussion paper suggesting:
“A defined process for a specific
period of time to address the Iraq
situation.”55 The proposal, explained
Graham, was intended to “close
the gap between the radical French
position and that of the Americans.” 56
The Americans, initially silent on the
Canadian proposal, expressed their
disapproval when it became obvious
it would divert votes from a new
American-drafted resolution.57 The
next day the United States, United
Kingdom and Spain introduced a
draft resolution stating “Iraq has
failed to take the final opportunity
afforded to it in Resolution 1441.”58
The draft was abandoned when it
became clear it would not receive
the necessary votes in the Security
Council.
From Ottawa, Prime Minister
Chrétien maintained telephone
contact with Lagos and Fox. Both
were under pressure from the
Americans to join the coalition, but
both men told Chrétien that they
would not participate if Canada
would refuse as well.59 Decision time
was looming for all nations involved.
In the House of Commons on 25
February, Chrétien said he expected
“a vote before the second week of

8
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March.”60 Chrétien told the House the
best means of achieving peace was
“working discreetly and effectively,
as our ambassador to the United
Nations is doing.”
Indeed, Heinbecker continued
to work the backrooms and
corridors of the United Nations,
seeking a compromise. On 11 March,
Heinbecker once again was recognized
to speak in the Security Council. He
underscored the importance of the
deliberations, proclaiming: “Peace
and war hang in the balance.” 61
Heinbecker acknowledged the Iraqis
had only co-operated as a result
of outside pressure, but urged the
Council to avoid creating “doubt
as to whether war were indeed
the last resort.” In addition to the
threats to international security
he had noted in February, he told
the Council it risked undermining
international law and the Security
Council as an institution. Heinbecker
reiterated his call for a clear list
of disarmament objectives to be
completed by Iraq before the Council
took “all necessary means to force
compliance.”62 Rather than six weeks,
Heinbecker shortened the suggested
deadline for Iraqi compliance to
three weeks. By compromising on
a resolution, Heinbecker told the
Council, “disarmament of Iraq can
be had without a shot being fired.”
The Canadian delegation
opted not to put direct pressure
on the Americans to accept the
compromise, but instead attempted
to persuade the Security Council as
a whole. Heinbecker was sure the
Americans would ignore a direct
Canadian appeal that advised a
compromise.63 The only chance was
through the gathered strength of
countries that agreed with Canada.
Canada had recently served on the
Security Council, and was familiar
with its politics. They were able to
generate some momentum for a
compromise, helped particularly by
the British delegation, frantic to reach
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a rapprochement between the French
and American positions. 64 Besides
certain British officials, there were
even “some Americans who hoped
for compromise that might avoid a
potentially fateful adventure that
lacked international sanction.”65
The Canadian position might
have succeeded by two means. If the
French had accepted the compromise,
the British would have had to accept
and the Americans would have
had to commit to the compromise
or face war without the support of
its closest ally. If Washington had
agreed to the compromise, the French
position would have lost all basis for
complaint. 66 Heinbecker recalls, “it
was actually a very good idea. The
only thing wrong with it, of course,
was that the Americans had made up
their mind and wanted a war. War
was not the final recourse for them.”67
The Americans had also decided
to adopt a rather undiplomatic
approach towards those who
disagreed with them at the United
Nations. The US “hardball” approach
resulted in the removal of the
Mexican, Chilean and Costa Rican
ambassadors and an attempt to have
the German ambassador removed.
The Americans also undertook
a campaign against Heinbecker.
Having been informed by Heinbecker
that the Americans were complaining
loudly about his actions, Chrétien
responded in his own unique style.
“You’re a big guy aren’t you?”
Chrétien asked Heinbecker. “You
know what big guys do, they just
ignore that stuff.” 68
Despite Chrétien’s backing,
Heinbecker had little expectation of
success. But the circumstances were
so grave, and “the consequences of
failure were such, that if you made
a 100% effort on the 5% chance, you
might find some traction.” 69 The
Canadians were disappointed, but
not surprised, when White House
Spokesman Ari Fleischer dismissed
the Canadian compromise, and

a similar Chilean one, as being
a “non-starter.” 70 The Americans
were careful not to appear too hamhanded, however, and did not go
far in opposing the Canadian idea
publicly. It appeared to Kergin in
Washington that the United States
had taken a calculated look at the
positions in the Security Council and
had realized the French were too far
committed to an anti-war position to
agree to a resolution that allowed the
possible use of force.71 The Americans
anticipated correctly, and a lack of
French support eliminated hope
for the compromise.72 It is striking,
however, that one of the results of the
Canadian compromise position could
have resulted in United Nations
approval for war. This would have
placed Chrétien in a much worse
position, with a commitment to the
United Nations process in direct
opposition to Canadian public
opinion and his own instincts.
Four days after Heinbecker’s
impassioned speech at the United
Nations, the Canadian public once
again took to the streets. On 15 March
2003, large protests swept provincial
capitals, Ottawa, and smaller cities.
This time, over 200,000 protesters
took to the street in Montreal, boosted
by calls from the Quebec Federation
of Labour urging its half-million
strong membership to participate.
In Vancouver, there were 10,000
protesters, 5,000 in Toronto, 2,000
in London, 1,500 in Ottawa, and
hundreds in Edmonton, Winnipeg
and Halifax. 73
Despite this outpouring of
anti-war sentiment, the Canadian
government never attributed any
of its decisions to public opinion.
According to David Anderson,
demonstrations are only taken into
account if they “confirm an existing
position or are a real surprise.” When
they do confirm a position, they are
a political boon to a government. 74
In the case of Iraq, the protests and
public polling results demonstrated
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Prime Minister Jean Chretien receives a standing ovation after defending the government’s stand on the war in Iraq in a speech in
the House of Commons in Ottawa, 8 April 2003.

to Chrétien and his Cabinet that
Canadians were opposed to the war,
and particularly so if military action
was not sanctioned by the Security
Council. But this only confirmed
the position Chrétien had given
Bush in September 2002. Indeed, the
timing supports Eddie Goldenberg’s
argument the decision was based on
principle – not public opinion.75
Although there were protests
across the country in March, the largest
demonstrations were in Quebec. The
strong anti-war sentiment in Montreal
has led the noted historian Jack
Granatstein to greatly overestimate
the role of Quebec public opinion in
Chrétien’s decision not to participate
in the invasion. For Granatstein,
who views the decision as part of
a larger historical trend of Quebec
determining Canadian foreign and
defence policy, the “key” to the Iraq
decision “was Quebec’s vehement
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anti-war opinion.” For his part, Eddie
Goldenberg remembers no reference
to Quebec in his discussions on Iraq
with the prime minister or with
Cabinet, though it was well known
where Quebeckers stood. 76 And
Quebeckers stood, largely, in support
of the conclusions that Chretien had
begun to draw in 2002. With Quebec
public opinion aligned with the prime
minister’s opinions, there was little
need to discuss Quebec in Cabinet. As
Quebec public opinion continued to
support the government, there never
came a time to consider the impact of
a decision that might place Ottawa at
odds with the province.77
Certainly not all Canadians were
against participation in a war with
Iraq, and some loudly called for
war. Business lobbyists, notably the
Canadian Council of Chief Executives
and the Canadian Manufacturers
and Exporters Association of Canada

were concerned that failure to
comply with the United States would
adversely affect their bottom line.
Kergin doubted the likelihood of such
punishment, believing CanadianAmerican trade relations were the
product of economic, rather than
political, interests.78 Graham thought
the business lobby was overreacting
to possible US retaliation and failed
to recognize war requires assent from
the population. He refused to equate
the decision for war with business
transactions.79 Anderson found the
business community’s behaviour
just as abhorrent. He rejected the
notion that commercial relations
should impact a decision to go to war,
refusing to measure loss of sales with
loss of life. Furthermore, Anderson
knew Canada had “a few cards up
our sleeve” if the United States chose
to punish Canada economically.
Challenges to oil sands development
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projects, or decisions concerning
pipelines and other energy facilities
could get the Americans’ attention.80
Overall, however, neither Kergin in
Washington nor Anderson, Graham
or Goldenberg in Ottawa saw serious
evidence the Americans would
retaliate.
The economic data confirms that
there were no significant changes
to Canada’s economic position visà-vis the U.S. In 2003, Canada’s
merchandise trade balance with the
United States was at the lowest point
of a decline begun in 2001. Following
Canada’s refusal to join the invasion,
the Canadian trade balance actually
improved.81 American foreign direct
investment in Canada, which had
steadily increased since the 1990s,
continued to grow after the Iraq
invasion. 82 After the war analysts
including Rick Fawn speculated that
by not joining the war Canada had
foregone economic opportunities
including a more conciliatory US

position on softwood lumber.83 There
is no evidence of such a quid pro quo
being offered by the United States.
Upon further analysis, Fawn later
conceded that the trade statistics
demonstrated “no serious politically
motivated economic retaliation
occurred.”84
After months of diplomacy,
the Americans and British clumsily
abandoned the United Nations,
forcing Canada to refuse to participate
in the coming invasion. On 15 and 16
March, while the leaders of Spain,
Portugal, Britain and the United
States met in the Azores, the British
made a last unsuccessful effort to
convince the Security Council to
adopt a new resolution authorizing
force. Hans Blix would later recall
of March 16 that his inspection
was operating at full strength,
and “Iraq seemed determined to
give [UNMOVIC] prompt access
everywhere.” That day, he took a
call from a United States diplomat

urging the expeditious withdrawal
of Blix’s inspectors from Iraq.85 War
was imminent.
The next day, on 17 March, a
morning telephone call from the
British government put a pointed
request to Ottawa. 86 The British
call posed four questions to the
government, asking whether Canada
would provide political or military
support for the invasion and if
Canada would make its assistance
public.87
Immediately, Heinbecker was
telephoned in New York, and
he reported no UN resolution
authorizing the use of force would
succeed. Chrétien, his foreign
policy advisor Claude Laverdure,
Goldenberg and Heinbecker were all
opposed to supporting an invasion.88
In Chretien’s office, Goldenberg
insisted the prime minister make his
response in the House of Commons
before informing Cellucci or any
other foreign government. The

A Sea King from HMCS Vancouver hovers over the merchant vessel MV Zakat, which has suffered a major engine breakdown. Despite
the six-degree list to port, HMCS Vancouver’s boarding party took control of ship and crew, then conducted a thorough search. The
Canadians found evidence of smuggling, including documents, communications and repair equipment, technical facilities and a full
load of Iraqi oil. The Zakat was towed into the Arabian Gulf by HMCS Vancouver and handed over to other coalition forces for further
investigation. HMCS Vancouver was conducting maritime interdiction operations in the north Arabian Sea as part of Operation
APOLLO, Canada’s military contribution to the international campaign against terrorism.
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British and American delegations
in Ottawa were informed at noon
the prime minister would provide
an answer to the British questions
in the House around 1415 hours.
By the time Chrétien spoke, the
Cable News Network (CNN) had
been informed by the Americans
that breaking news was about to be
made and carried Question Period
live.89 Chrétien’s stood in the House
and announced: “If military action
proceeds without a new resolution of
the Security Council, Canada will not
participate.” His remarks were met
with loud cheers and an ovation from

his ministers and backbenchers – all
live on American television.90
Over the next two days, Chrétien
explained his position to the House,
noting the issues that had concerned
him in September 2002. Chrétien
reminded Parliament he had “spoken
very clearly that the position of
changing of regimes in different
countries is not a policy that is
desirable any time.” 91 He turned
the focus back to weapons of mass
destruction, arguing “Saddam
Hussein was disarming…I am
still of the view, given some more
weeks, disarmament could have been

achieved.” Overall, said Chrétien,
“it is better not to have war as the
first instance but as the last instance
…[The Americans and British] had
not made a case for the necessity of
waging war on Iraq at this time.”
Still, the decision was not without
significant risk. Days after Chrétien’s
announcement, with the invasion
underway, President of the Treasury
Board Lucienne Robillard raised an
ominous question in Cabinet: “What
if [the Americans] find WMD?” No
one could answer her question, and
a tense wait followed Chrétien’s
decision to abstain from the

US Air Force Photo

US Army M1A1 Abrams main battle tanks and personnel from the 1st Armored Division pose for
a photo under the “Hands of Victory” in Ceremony Square, Baghdad, Iraq during Operation Iraqi
Freedom. The Hands of Victory monument was built at the end of the Iran-Iraq war and marks
the entrance to a large parade ground in central Baghdad. The hand and arm are modelled after
former dictator Saddam Hussein’s own and are surrounded with thousands of Iranian helmets
taken from the battlefield. The swords are made from the guns of dead Iraqi soldiers, melted and
recast into the 24-ton blades.
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coalition.92 While the ground assault
against Iraq unfolded rapidly with
early success, the Canadian as well
as French and German governments
were uneasy. They continued to
privately pressure the British on
their claims of the reputed weapons
of mass destruction.93 It would be
months before the Canadians had the
grim satisfaction of knowing they had
made a wise choice.
The raucous approval Chrétien
received in the House pained
Cellucci, who suffered “truly bitter
disappointment” Canada did not
join in the invasion.94 Cellucci had
not taken care to cultivate close
relationships with a broad crosssection of officials in Ottawa, and
isolated himself from senior Canadian
political advisors. 95 He seems to have
been convinced by some Canadian
public servants that Canada would
join the American invasion and either
informed his masters of Canada’s
likelihood of joining, or failed to
suggest the possibility of Canada
not joining. Either way, he looked
foolish when Canada did not join the
coalition, and he took his anger out on
Graham during a “very cool” dinner
at the Lester B. Pearson Building.96
Although Stein and Lang claim
the “Americans were more than a
little surprised” by the Canadian
decision, it had been clear to many
in Washington that Canada would
not participate barring Security
Council approval. Kergin received
stiff comments from administration
officials and outright contemptuous
remarks from Congressmen, but the
American government was not taken
by surprise.97 Chief of Staff Andrew
Card told Chrétien “you told us
right from the beginning what you
intended to do…We should have
believed you.”98
The decision not to inform the
Americans but instead to announce
in the House of Commons – with
the government caucus standing to
loudly cheer the decision – created
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an undiplomatic spectacle in the
House of Commons later regretted
by some. Kergin, who believed the
courtesy of a communiqué should
have been extended to the United
States, says the decision resulted
in some unnecessary bad will. The
difficulties derived more from a lack
of acceptable practice, rather than
from the substance of the decision.99
Later comments from Chrétien and
his staffers further distanced Bush
from Chrétien. Bush cancelled a
state visit planned for May 2003,
and at the end of that month, Rice
called Laverdure to tell him the two
leaders’ relationship was “irreparably
broken.”100
Some in the Canadian business
community were incensed by
the decision not to support the
Americans. Businessmen stopped
Graham in airports, and none-toopolitely made clear their views on
his decision. Provincial premiers
Ralph Klein, Ernie Eves and Gordon
Campbell were quick to criticize
the Canadian policy, obviously
concerned the decision would affect
provincial economies. Neither was
the federal cabinet opinion fully
unanimous.101 Secretary of State for
International Financial Institutions
Maurizio Bevilacqua was furious with
the government’s position, arguing
that it was crazy to disagree with the
United States.102 In the overwrought
hyperbole of the House of Commons,
Leader of the Opposition Stephen
Harper compared the Canadian
decision not to participate with the
failure to confront Nazi Germany in
the 1930’s.103
Despite the overblown rhetoric of
the government’s critics, CanadianAmerican trade and diplomatic
relations remained strong. Following
the invasion, Kergin directed
Canadian consulates to undertake a
major study to determine if anything
had changed in US-Canadian
business relations. Although some
individual consumers made choices

designed to spite Canada, including
refusal to buy Canadian maple syrup,
there was no large-scale punishment
meted out and no major contracts
lost. It was determined that there
was no economic consequence to
Canada’s decision. 104 At a speech
by Graham to the Chicago Council
of Foreign Relations in November
2003, during the question and answer
period, the audience suggested two
reasons Canada was insulated from
an economic backlash: first, Canada
had made its decision without what
was perceived as the self-righteous
attitude of the French. Second, the
American business community had
significant investments in Canada
and the notion that Americans could
punish Canadian businesses without
harming themselves was a chimera.
It was clear to Graham that economic
integration worked in Canada’s
favour.105
Graham and Powell continued
to work closely on issues of joint
importance, including Haiti and
Afghanistan, and this cooperation
softened any backlash at the
diplomatic level. In Washington, the
Canadian Embassy was not sidelined
from updates on the war after the
invasion. Instead, senior Canadian
diplomats were invited to attend
briefings given by Rumsfeld to the
“coalition of the willing” partners.
Canadians received updates on
Operation Iraqi Freedom until the war
became increasingly complicated and
Rumsfeld reduced the frequency of
the meetings.106 None of the Canadian
troops serving on exchange with the
American, British and Australian
forces were killed, and the uproar
created by the Opposition in the
prelude to war largely disappeared
from memory.
The prime minister’s appreciation
of the situation, made so early, resulted
from what his colleagues describe as
an uncanny intuition. It stemmed
from his ability to see through the
flattering and cajoling of the United
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States, to understand the Americans
had not proven their case, but largely,
Anderson suspects, because “it
offended every nerve in his body.”107
Both Graham and Anderson identify
the unquantifiable “shrewdness” of
Chrétien as the major factor behind
his decision.108 Chrétien anticipated
Canadian political opinion on the
topic, but made his decision long
before demonstrators had taken to
the streets. He knew instinctively
that the American evidence was
insufficient to “convince any judge in
a rural courthouse” before Canadian
intelligence analysts came to the same
conclusion.109 Most of all, Chrétien
knew that the invasion of Iraq
was not commensurate with the
essence of the United Nations he
considered a part of the Canadian
identity. All the while, Chrétien and
his diplomats worked to provide
a dignified opportunity for the
Americans to re-robe. They refused,
of course, and suffered more than the
embarrassment of exposure.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.

18.

Notes
The author owes special thanks to Robert
Bothwell and to an anonymous reviewer from
Canadian Military History. This article was
researched and written with support from a
Department of National Defence Security and
Defence Forum MA Scholarship.
1.
2.

3.

Michael Kergin, interview by author, 10
April 2008, Toronto, ON.
For details on the Canadian Forces
deployments following 11 September
2001, see “Backgrounder: The Canadian
Forces’ Contribution to the International
Campaign Against Terrorism,” News
Room, Canadian Expeditionary Force
Command, National Defence and the
Canadian Forces, <www.comfec.forces.
gc.ca/pa-ap/nr-sp/doc-eng.asp?id=490>
(accessed August 31, 2010).
The policy process that led to the
American decision to invade Iraq is a
controversial and complex one; space
does not permit its rehashing here. An
examination of the decision should
begin with Bob Woodward, Plan of Attack
(New York: Simon & Schuster, 2004).
For further reading, see the expansive
“Iraq Wars Bibliography” assembled
by Edwin Moïse at Clemson University:
<www.clemson.edu/caah/history/

18
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol19/iss4/2

Sayle - Iraq War REV.indd 14

19.

20.
21.
22.

23.
24.

facultypages/EdMoise/iraqbib.html>
(accessed August 31, 2010).
Greg Fyffe, interview by author, 31 March
2008, Toronto, ON.
Jean Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister.
(USA: Alfred A. Knopf Canada, 2007).
p.306.
Kergin interview.
Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister,
p.307.
Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister,
pp.307-8.
Eddie Goldenberg, The Way It Works:
Inside Ottawa. (Toronto: Mclelland &
Stewart, 2007), p.289.
Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister,
p.310, and Paul Cellucci, Unquiet
Diplomacy. (Toronto: Key Porter Books,
2007), p.122, and Goldenberg, The Way It
Works, p.285.
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, pp.286-7.
Kergin interview.
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.287
Mel Cappe, interview by author, 14 March
2008, via telephone.
David Malone, The International Struggle
Over Iraq: Politics in the UN Security
Council 1980-2005 (Toronto: Oxford
University Press, 2006), p.192.
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.289.
Resolution 1441 (2002), United Nations
Security Council. 8 November 2002.
Available online at <www.un.org/
documents/>.
The debate over the Resolution was not
limited to arguments between states; in
both the United States and the United
Kingdom, cabinet officials disagreed
amongst each other whether 1441 was
sufficient to authorize force. In the United
States, the Offices of the Secretary of
Defense and of the Vice President argued
no new Security Council resolution was
required, while Secretary of State Colin
Powell pushed for a second resolution.
Philip H. Gordon and Jeremy Shapiro,
Allies at War: America, Europe and the Crisis
Over Iraq (Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 2004).
According to David Malone, “it may
have been the UK need for a second
Resolution that precipitated the clash
within the Security Council.” Malone, The
International Struggle Over Iraq, p.196.
Bill Graham, interview by author, 20
February 2008, Toronto, ON.
Graham interview.
Kergin interview. Rob McRae, Director
General of the Department of Foreign
Affair’s Policy Planning Bureau in 2003,
concurs that the United States sought a
commitment from Canada in terms of
credibility rather than hard power assets.
See Rob McRae, “International Policy
Reviews in Perspective,” in Canada among
Nations 2004 : Setting Priorities Straight, ed.
Fen Osler Hampson, Norman Hillmer,
and David Carment (Montréal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2005), p.63.
Janice Gross Stein and Eugene Lang,
The Unexpected War: Canada in Kandahar
(Toronto: Viking Canada, 2007), p.71.
Graham interview.

25. In October 2002, a Canadian defence
analyst had observed how ill prepared
the Canadian Forces were for the “fastmoving conventional conflict” that was
expected in Iraq. David Rudd, “Is the
Cupboard Bare? The Canadian Forces
in Iraq,” CISS Commentary, 2002, <www.
ciss.ca/Comment_CupboardBare.htm>
(accessed 31 August 2010).
26. “Liberal dissent, confusion brewing over
Iraq crisis, Star reports.” Canadian Press
NewsWire, 14 January 2003. Available
online at Canadian Business & Current
Affairs index [hereafter CBCA].
27. David Anderson, interview by author, 11
March 2008, via telephone.
28. Edward Goldenberg, interview by author,
7 May 2007, Toronto, ON.
29. Robert Fife, “Manley secretly pressed
Cabinet to support war: PM dismissed
warning of a backlash from U.S.,” National
Post, 26 March 2003.
30. Goldenberg, The Way It Works, pp.288-9.
31. Goldenberg interview.
32. “Liberal dissent, confusion brewing over
Iraq crisis, Star reports,” Canadian Press
NewsWire, 14 January 2003.
33. Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.296
34. Cellucci, Unquiet Diplomacy, p.146.
35. Anderson interview.
36. Paul Heinbecker, interview by author, 17
March 2008, via telephone.
37. Graham interview.
38. Robert Russo, “Powell briefs Graham
on decisive February. 5 speech at UN
on disarming Iraq,” Canadian Press
NewsWire, 31 January 2003 in CBCA.
39. Donald McKenzie, “Ten per cent of
Canadians support unilateral strike
against Iraq: poll,” Canadian Press
NewsWire, 2 February 2003, in CBCA.
40. Cappe interview.
41. Malone, The International Struggle Over
Iraq, 197.
42. Heinbecker interview.
43. Goldenberg.
44. Fyffe interview. For an examination of
the less successful intelligence analysis
conducted in the United States, see Robert
Jervis, Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from
the Iranian Revolution and the Iraq War
(Cornell Studies in Security Affairs,
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2010)
Mark Danner has written on the British
experience; his essays are collected in
Mark Danner, The Secret Way to War: The
Downing Street Memo and the Iraq War’s
Buried History (New York: New York
Review Books, 2006). A book-length
study has been devoted to “Curveball.”
See Bob Drogin, Curveball: Spies, Lies and
the Con Man Who Caused a War (New York:
Random House, 2007).
45. Kergin interview.
46. Fyffe interview.
47. Heinbecker interview.
48. Heinbecker interview.
49. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister,
pp.13-4.
50. Jean Chrétien, “Notes for an Address
by Prime Minister Jean Chrétien to the
Chicago Council on Foreign Relations,”

14

1/24/2011 12:27:48 PM

: “But he has nothing on at all!” Canada and the Iraq War, 2003

51.

52.

53.
54.
55.

56.
57.

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.

74.
75.
76.
77.
78.

13 February 2003, Chicago, Illinois,
Available online from the Privy Council
of Office, Government of Canada <www.
pco-bcp.gc.ca/>
Donald McKenzie, “Ten per cent of
Canadians support unilateral strike
against Iraq: poll,” Canadian Press
NewsWire, 2 February 2003, in CBCA.
Minutes of the 4709th meeting of the
United Nations Security Council, 19
February 2003. 28. Available online at
<www.un.org/documents/>.
Debates, 20 February 2003.
Debates, 21 February 2003.
“Text of Canadian discussion paper
on Iraq that Canada’s UN ambassador
circulated this week,” Canadian Press
NewsWire, 27 February 2003, in CBCA.
Debates, 27 February 2003.
Robert Russo, “Wary Bush says Canadian
proposal on Iraq gives Saddam too much
time,” Canadian Press NewsWire, 26
February 2003.
Malone, The International Struggle Over
Iraq, pp.198-199.
Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister,
313-4.
Debates, 25 February 2003.
Minutes of the 4717th meeting of the
United Nations Security Council, 11
March 2003, p.19.
Minutes of the 4717th meeting of the
United Nations Security Council, 11
March 2003, p.20.
Heinbecker interview.
Malone, The International Struggle Over
Iraq, p.199.
Heinbecker interview.
Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, p.153.
Heinbecker interview.
Heinbecker interview.
Heinbecker interview.
Gordon and Shapiro, Allies at War, p.153.
Kergin interview.
Malone, The International Struggle Over
Iraq, p.199.
Arpon Basu “Some 200,000 people in
Montreal join countrywide protests
against war in Iraq,” 15 March 2003, and
“1,250 turn out in Edmonton, Winnipeg,
Vancouver for vigils to oppose Iraqi war,”
17 March 2003, both in Canadian Press
NewsWire in CBCA.
Anderson interview.
Goldenberg interview.
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, 297 and
Edward Goldenberg, correspondence
with author, 2 June 2008.
Goldenberg interview.
Kergin interview.

Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010

Sayle - Iraq War REV.indd 15

79. Graham interview.
80. Anderson interview.
81. See Chart 20.2 “Merchandise trade
balance” in Statistics Canada, Canada
Year Book: Official Statistical Annual of
the Resources, History, Institutions and
Social and Economic Conditions of Canada
(Ottawa, 2009), p.238.
82. S e e C A N S I M T a b l e 3 7 6 - 0 0 5 1
“International investment position,
Canadian direct investment abroad
and foreign direct investment in
Canada, by country, annual (dollars).”
The relevant details are excerpted
and available from the Department of
Foreign Affairs and International Trade.
“Foreign Directs Investment Statistics,”
<www.international.gc.ca/economisteconomiste/statistics-statistiques/
investments-investissements.
aspx>(accessed July 12, 2010).
83. Rick Fawn, “Canada: Outside the AngloAmerican Fold,” in The Iraq War: Causes
and Consequences, ed. Rick Fawn and
Raymond A. Hinnebusch (Boulder,
Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers,
2006), p.116. Derek Burney, too, considers
the Iraq War a missed opportunity for
Canada to gain influence over the U.S.
on bilateral issues like mad cow disease
or softwood lumber. See Derek Burney,
“Managing Canada-US Relations,” in
Canada Among Nations 2005: Split Images,
ed. Andrew Fenton Cooper and D.
Rowlands (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s
University Press, 2005), p.53.
84. Rick Fawn, “No Consensus with the
Commonwealth, No Consensus with
Itself? Canada and the Iraq War,” The
Round Table 97, no. 397 (2008), p.530.
85. Hans Blix, Disarming Iraq, (New York:
Pantheon Books, 2004), pp.3-6.
86. Goldenberg interview.
87. T h e q u e s t i o n s a r e r e c o u n t e d i n
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.1.
88. Goldenberg, The Way It Works, pp.2-4.
89. Goldenberg interview.
90. Debates, 17 March 2003.
91. Debates, 18 March 2003.
92. Goldenberg interview.
93. Peter Stothard, 30 Days: A Month at the
Heart of Blair’s War (London: Harper
Collins, 2003), pp.199-207.
94. Cellucci, Unquiet Diplomacy, 141.
95. Goldenberg interview.
96. Graham interview.
97. Kergin interview.
98. Chrétien, My Years As Prime Minister,
p.315. Some reports suggest that Ottawa
notified the Americans of the Canadian

99.
100.
101.

102.
103.

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.

decision in the morning before the prime
minister’s House of Commons speech,
but these seem to be confused. John
Noble claims he has confirmed Chrétien
asked his “diplomatic advisor” to call
Rice before the announcement, but he
does not provide his source. He does,
however cite Bob Woodward, who has
Rice say on March 18 that she had spoken
with her Canadian counterpart. The CNN
coverage, however, was on March 17.
See John J. Noble, “PMO/PCO/DFAIT:
Serving the Prime Minister’s Foreign
Policy Agenda,” in Canada among Nations
2007 : What Room for Manoeuvre?, ed.
Jean Daudelin and Daniel Schwanen
(Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University
Press, 2008), p.51. Also Woodward, Plan
of Attack.
Kergin interview.
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.307.
Robert Fife, “Manley secretly pressed
Cabinet to support war: PM dismissed
warning of a backlash from U.S.,” National
Post, 26 March 2003.
Ibid., and Graham interview.
Debates, 20 March 2003. According to
his biographer, Harper “mimize[d] his
previous commitment for Canada to go
to war” in 2004. See William Johnson,
Stephen Harper and the Future of Canada
(Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 2005),
p.318.
Kergin interview.
Graham interview.
Peter Boehm, correspondence with
author, 14 April 2008.
Anderson interview. Consider, for
example, Chrétien’s previous position
against war in Iraq in 1991.
Graham and Anderson interviews.
Goldenberg, The Way It Works, p.287.

Timothy Andrews Sayle is the Davis
Fellow in Foreign Policy at the Center
for the Study of Force and Diplomacy
and a PhD student in history at Temple
University, Philadelphia. His research
interests include the Canadian-American
relationship and transatlantic relations
during the Cold War.

19

15

1/24/2011 12:27:49 PM

